Approved ⊑ or Release	0004100144	OLA DDDGGDG47	^^Б^^
Annroved her Release	ついいれんしんりょう	LIV-KINDXUKUM	2012000500060050_2
Approved meet itelease	ZUUT/UU/17 .	CIA-INDI GUINGTI	20110000000000000

SECRET	

25X1

27 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Internal Agency Tasking for Committee Project

- 1. The assignment levied on the Agency in your 25 April meeting can probably best be discharged by the following two-step procedure: (1) generating 17 separate papers (autlined below) with a request that they be delivered to you (or to this office) by OOB Monday, 15 May; (2) having this office draft the overall document which will be your Committee input. The latter will be a distillate synthesis of these separate papers and may incorporate at least some of them as annexes. We would undertake to have the final package ready by COB Monday, 22 May.
- 2. The separate papers required are enumerated below, along with the offices I think should be responsible for and/or assist in their preparation:
 - a) An analysis of the military situation in South Vietnam (SAVA, working with OCI).
 - b) An analysis of pacification (SAVA -- this can be an update of our 17 February memorandum on this very topic).
 - c) An analysis of political developments and prospects in South Vietnam (SAVA, drawing on our 19 April memowhich covers most of the required ground).
 - d) An analysis of South Vietnam's economy (ORR).
 - e) An analysis of North Vietnam's economy (ORR).

SECRET/	
SECREI/	

25X1

SECRET	
SECRET	

- f) Communist order of battle, including comments on unit effectiveness, infiltration, recruitment and losses (SAVA with the cooperation of, and much of the work done by, ORR, OCI and ONE. This topic overlaps which is now in process).
- g) State of the Viet Cong infrastructure (SAVA in conjunction with VNO and the Vietnam Station; work on this is already in train).
- h) An assessment of the intelligence attack on the VC infrastructure (VNO -- this is already in process at Komer's request).
- i) North Vietnamese (Communist) political capabilities in the non-Communist world (OCI).
- j) North Vietnam: (1) Motivation and intentions, (2) GVN/allied successes Hanoi would tolerate in the south, (3) GVN/allied successes Hanoi would permit on North Vietnamese territory (OCI, with ONE and SAVA helping).
- k) Chinese attitudes towards the Vietnamese war, including comments on GVN/allied successes China could tolerate in the south and in the north (ONE, with help from OCI).
- 1) Soviet attitudes towards the Vietnamese war, including GVN/allied successes the USSR could tolerate in the south and in the north (ONE. This overlaps SNIE 11-11-67, which went to the USIB Representatives in draft form on 26 April).
- m) Effectiveness of our aerial operations against North Vietnam and of the enemy efforts to combat and compensate for them (ORR, with SAVA and OCI).
- n) Effect of the bombing on North Vietnamese thinking, particularly in regard to negotiations (OCI).

_	2 _
SECRET	

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/14 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000500060050-2

	SECRET	25X1
	o) The international state of mind on Vietnam of the Board of National Estimates). p) Probable North Vietnamese, Russian, Chinese, South Vietnamese and other countries' reactions to a major increase over the next two years in U.S. force strength and in the scope of U.S. military action (ONE). q) Probable North Vietnamese, Russian, Chinese, South Vietnamese and other countries' reactions to a continuation	25X1
2	over the next two years of present U.S. military policies conducted with approximately present force levels. 3. This gives SAVA five papers, two of which are largely done already. OCI and ORR will each have three papers. FE/ will have one, already in train. ONE will have five, one of which would do himself and one of which overlaps an estimate already out in draft. 4. If you approve the above tasking and so desire, I will get in touch with Messrs. Kent, Lehman and this afternoon and levy the	25X1 25X1 25X1
	requirements. I plan to contact each office head separately and present these as requirements from you for your use, taking my text from your comments at the last two Morning Meetings. George A. Carver, Jr. Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs	
	GAC/mee Orig - Mr. Helms 1 - DCI Audit Project 1 - GAC Chrono	

25X1

SECRET/